Tehran and Washington: A War Without Resolution, or a Deferred Settlement?
The American and Israeli elections narrow Trump and Netanyahu's room for maneuver, as the Strait of Hormuz turns into a pressure card in an open struggle over the region's future
The war between the United States and Israel on one side, and Iran on the other, is no longer merely a military confrontation over nuclear facilities or missile capabilities. It is a test of military power's ability to achieve political objectives, of the limits of economic pressure in subduing adversaries, and of the effect of elections and domestic calculations on decisions of war and peace.
After months of confrontation, military superiority alone does not appear capable of producing a final strategic resolution. Military and nuclear facilities may be destroyed and an adversary's capabilities degraded, but that does not necessarily mean toppling its political system, ending its regional influence, or guaranteeing the region's stability once military operations stop.
Meanwhile, the cost of the confrontation for the global economy is rising, and navigation in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz remains exposed to risk, as US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu face two electoral tests close together in time, which may affect their political and military calculations.
The central question today is not who owns the most advanced weapons, but who can convert military pressure into sustainable political gains, and who will manage to avoid a wider war whose price the Middle East and the global economy would pay.
First: Military superiority does not necessarily mean political victory
A distinction must be drawn between three different objectives: destroying Iran's military capabilities, weakening its nuclear program, and toppling the political system in Tehran. Each objective has its own conditions and tools, and achieving one does not automatically achieve the others.
Airstrikes may succeed in destroying facilities or inflicting heavy damage on military infrastructure, but they do not guarantee a change in the Iranian leadership's behavior, nor do they by themselves provide a stable political alternative inside the country.
Toppling the regime is a more complex and dangerous objective, because its outcomes depend on internal Iranian balances, the position of the security and military institutions, and the opposition's ability to organize a political alternative, in addition to the risks of chaos and of the conflict spreading beyond Iran's borders.
The paradox is that continuing the war may weaken Iran militarily, but it may also push it to cling to its remaining cards of strength and to use maritime navigation and regional influence as a means of raising the cost of the confrontation for its adversaries.
That is why declaring military victory is not enough on its own to answer the most important question: has the region become safer, and have the nuclear and regional risks receded, or has the war reproduced them in new forms?
Second: The US-Iran negotiations.. the dispute over the sequencing of concessions
Recent diplomatic developments have shown that the door to negotiation has not been fully closed, but it remains hemmed in by a fundamental dispute over priorities and guarantees.
According to a Reuters report on October 18, Tehran re-floated a proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days, conditional on a response to demands concerning the blockade imposed on its ports, the sanctions on its oil exports, and a halt to combat operations on regional fronts. Washington, for its part, insists on giving the nuclear file and uranium enrichment primary priority in any understanding. [Reuters, October 18]
Here lies the knot of the negotiation: Washington wants nuclear and security guarantees before easing pressure, while Tehran sees de-escalation, lifting the blockade, and easing sanctions as part of the quid pro quo it must receive.
Each side fears offering concessions first, only to find itself facing an adversary that has regained its ability to apply pressure without honoring its commitments.
Hence, a reciprocal interim agreement appears more realistic than betting on a comprehensive, immediate settlement. Such an agreement could begin with verifiable steps on navigation security and a halt to some attacks, followed by a time-bound negotiating track on the nuclear file, sanctions, and security guarantees.
But the success of this path requires more than declarations of intent; it needs clear verification mechanisms, reciprocal commitments, and guarantees that prevent its collapse at the first dispute.
Third: The Strait of Hormuz.. a strategic card beyond the Gulf's borders
The Strait of Hormuz has become one of the most prominent centers of gravity in the confrontation, not only because of its geographic location, but because of its direct impact on energy supplies and world trade.
Recent economic and security reports said no fewer than 18 attacks targeted ships in the region over two weeks, with the risks extending to waters outside the strait, including the Gulf of Oman. On October 21, oil markets continued to balance the continued flow of supplies against rising security risks. [Reuters, October 21]
The strait's importance lies in the fact that any sustained disruption in it raises insurance and shipping costs, pressures energy prices, and ultimately affects consumers and companies, including inside the United States itself.
Although alternative routes and pipelines have helped ease some of the disruption's effects, they do not remove the strategic risks tied to the maritime corridor.
Hence, an understanding on navigation could be a practical entry point to de-escalation, but it will not by itself resolve the nuclear dispute or end the strategic rivalry between Washington and Tehran.
Fourth: Netanyahu and the Israeli elections.. does Iran become a card in the battle for political survival?
Israel is heading to elections on October 27 amid sharp political polarization and questions about the management of the war, accountability for previous security failures, and the future of the current leadership.
Seat estimates published in recent polling models point to a close race between Benjamin Netanyahu's bloc and his opponents, without giving any side a clear guarantee of forming a stable government. One poll aggregation puts Netanyahu's bloc at around 52-54 seats, versus 52-54 for the Zionist opposition parties and 13-15 for the Arab parties, in a 120-seat Knesset. These are polling estimates, not final election results. [Israeli seat-poll average tracker]
More importantly, a change of prime minister does not necessarily mean a radical change in Israeli policy toward Iran. A Reuters analysis published on October 21 indicated that the core security orientations, above all containing Iran, weakening its capabilities, and relying on military deterrence, may continue even if the leadership changes. [Reuters, October 21]
Still, a political hypothesis cannot be ignored: could Netanyahu resort to a new military escalation against Iran if he faced the risk of losing the election or stumbled in forming a government?
These are hypotheses, not evidence that any potential attack would have staying in power as its sole aim.
The Financial Times reported that Netanyahu, during October, directed military preparations in anticipation of resuming wide strikes against Iran, and that an attack planned for October 10 was not carried out after an American objection. This indicates that the escalation option remains on the table, but it does not prove that a final decision has been made or that the elections are its decisive driver. [Financial Times, October 2026]
The real danger is that security calculations intersect with electoral interests, so that escalation becomes a means of reshaping the political agenda or restoring the image of a leadership capable of protecting the country. In such circumstances, miscalculation could lead to a wider war, even if no party wants to bear its full consequences.
Fifth: Trump and the November 3 election.. will the ballot box punish the war policy?
The US midterm elections, scheduled for November 3, acquire exceptional importance because they will determine the balance of power in Congress during the last two years of Trump's term.
According to the Reuters/Ipsos poll published on October 19, Trump's job approval reached 31%, the lowest the poll has recorded across his two presidencies. Democrats also led Republicans by 12 points on the party-preference question for the congressional elections: 47% to 35%. [Reuters/Ipsos, October 19]
The models show an estimated range for the Democrats of 229 to 242 seats in the House of Representatives, versus 193 to 206 for the Republicans, out of 435 seats. In the Senate, one central estimate puts the Democrats and their allied independents at 51 seats versus 49 for the Republicans, out of 100. These remain changeable projections, not a settled result.
The Democratic opposition needs net gains of four seats to control each of the two chambers, according to the current distribution reported by Reuters. Polls indicate that control of the House looks closer for the Democrats, while the Senate battle remains more complicated. [Reuters]
In this context, the foreign war cannot be separated from the domestic economy. Rising fuel prices and living costs could turn the confrontation with Iran from a national-security issue into an electoral burden on the administration, especially if voters conclude that costs are mounting without clear political results.
At his campaign rally in Kansas on October 19, Trump warned that Democrats might raise the Palestinian flag in the state, using the issue in the context of his attack on his political opponents.
This rhetoric reveals how present the Palestinian cause is in American electoral polarization, and how symbols associated with it are used to mobilize the electoral base.
Trump may seek to show diplomatic progress or de-escalation before the vote, especially if economic and political pressures grow. However, a Republican loss of one chamber would not give the Democrats direct authority to stop all military operations, since the president retains broad executive powers - though opposition control of Congress would strengthen oversight, investigations, and legislative and financial pressure.
Thus, the elections may not determine the end of the war, but they may change its political cost and the limits of the administration's ability to continue its approach without harsher accountability.
Sixth: Three scenarios for the future of the confrontation
Scenario one: a limited de-escalation understanding. Washington and Tehran may agree on temporary arrangements for navigation and a halt to some attacks, while deferring the more complex nuclear issues to later negotiations. That would give both sides a chance to lower the cost without declaring a strategic retreat.
Scenario two: continued confrontation and mutual pressure. If the preconditions remain in conflict, the strikes, threats, sanctions, and maritime disruptions may continue, with rising economic and security risks. This path could become a war of attrition that achieves no clear political victory for either side.
Scenario three: a wider regional escalation. Targeting strategic facilities, large numbers of casualties, or expanding attacks on navigation and energy infrastructure could lead to mutual responses that are hard to contain. The danger grows if this coincides with electoral calculations that narrow the space for political retreat.
The chances of moving from the second scenario to the first will hinge on specific indicators: how willing Washington is to discuss the Hormuz proposal, the emergence of practical steps to resume nuclear negotiations, the development of Israeli military preparations, and whether the election results encourage de-escalation or push the parties toward hardening their positions.
Who declares victory, and who pays the price?
In my assessment, we face a conflict in which military superiority is not enough to achieve political victory. The United States and Israel want to reduce Iran's capabilities and change its strategic behavior, while Tehran seeks to preserve the regime and its remaining cards of strength and to extract an easing of sanctions and pressures.
At the same time, the cost of the confrontation for the global economy is rising, and the elections in the United States and Israel are approaching, so national-security calculations intersect with the calculations of political survival.
But elections do not guarantee peace, just as continuing the war does not guarantee resolution. The methods of managing the conflict may change without its basic goals changing, while the possibilities of escalation remain if political leaders prefer showing strength over offering mutual concessions.
The real test is not any party's ability to declare its victory, but its ability to convert military and economic pressure into a durable settlement that prevents the war's expansion, protects navigation and energy, reduces nuclear-proliferation risks, and opens the way to a more stable regional security.
Wars may end when the parties become unable to keep fighting, but they only become successful settlements when the parties find an interest in stopping them and hold sufficient guarantees not to return to them.
Maher Abdelqader - New York
Author dateline: October 21, 2026. Published on Mahjar Post on October 23, 2026.
