Trump and Ukraine.. Is He Making Peace or Looking for a Strategic Exit from the War?
From wearing down Russia under Biden to reordering the balance of power under Trump.. How did the Ukraine war become part of America's larger confrontation with China? And will Washington succeed in imposing a quick settlement before the midterm election results turn into a constraint on the president's moves?
The shift in the American position on the Russian-Ukrainian war cannot be understood without looking at the fundamental difference between the philosophies of the Joe Biden and Donald Trump administrations toward Russia, and more importantly, toward China.
Under Biden, Washington's strategic goal, in coordination with its European allies, did not appear limited to helping Ukraine repel the Russian invasion; it extended to wearing down Russia's military and economic capabilities and weakening Moscow to the point of reducing its ability to threaten the European security order. The war, in this sense, was an opportunity to impose a long-term strategic cost on Russia, even without entering a direct military confrontation with it.
Trump, on the other hand, views the equation from a different angle. Excessively weakening Russia may not necessarily mean a strategic victory for the United States; it could instead produce the opposite result, pushing Moscow further into Beijing's embrace and deepening the partnership between the two powers that represent the greatest challenge to American influence.
Here lies the fundamental point of difference: while the Biden administration treated weakening Russia as a strategic goal in itself, Trump appears to treat the Russian-Chinese relationship as part of a larger equation in which containing China and curbing its rise comes at the top of American priorities.
This priority explains a large part of his policies toward Beijing, whether through the trade war and tariffs, restrictions on technology and strategic-materials exports, or attempts to control the energy sources China may depend on, including Iranian and Venezuelan oil.
From this perspective, settling the Ukraine war does not appear to be merely an attempt to end a conflict that has exhausted Washington and its allies, but part of a reordering of American priorities, freeing political, economic and strategic resources to deal with the great competition with China.
Trump does not necessarily want to defeat Russia.. he wants to recalibrate the relationship with it.
This does not mean that Washington and Moscow are on the road to an alliance, or that their strategic differences have disappeared; it means the Trump administration may see de-escalating the confrontation with Russia as an American gain if it helps limit the Russian-Chinese rapprochement and reduces American burdens in Europe.
Settling the war.. A Trump achievement or a reproduction of history's mistakes?
For this reason, the Trump administration seeks to market the Russian-Ukrainian negotiation track as a diplomatic achievement for the president, even before reaching a final agreement that ends the war.
Simply bringing Moscow and Kyiv back to the negotiating table after long months of estrangement, setting new dates for meetings, and talk of prisoner exchanges and confidence-building measures are now presented by Washington as an important breakthrough in a file that had long defied solution.
But a distinction must be made here between succeeding in launching a negotiation process and succeeding in producing a sustainable peace.
The negotiations led by Washington, through Trump's envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, have not yet settled the core disputes over Ukrainian territory, security guarantees for Kyiv, the future of the Western military presence in Europe, and Moscow's conditions regarding NATO.
Most importantly, Moscow still clings to its demands regarding the territories it controls, while Kyiv refuses to give up the rest of the Donbas region and demands security guarantees that would prevent a new Russian invasion after any agreement.
Here the real question arises: does the Trump administration seek to end the war through a settlement that addresses its causes and ensures it does not reignite, or to freeze it in a way that allows the American president to declare a diplomatic victory and exit the scene?
History offers an important warning in this regard.
In the 1973 Paris Agreements ending the American intervention in Vietnam, then-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger succeeded in engineering an agreement that allowed Washington to withdraw militarily and present that as a diplomatic achievement, without guaranteeing the survival of the political and military arrangements on which the agreement rested.
That approach was associated with the term "decent interval" - creating a period of time that would allow the United States to withdraw while preserving the image of victory, even if the agreement later collapsed.
And indeed, Saigon fell in 1975, about two years after the Paris Agreement.
The point is not that the Ukrainian case matches the Vietnamese case - the two contexts are entirely different - but that there is a recurring risk in American diplomacy: that securing a quick political exit for Washington becomes more important than building a settlement capable of enduring after it leaves the scene.
That is exactly what should be watched in the current negotiations.
Restructuring European security versus freezing the front
Another indicator of the nature of the American strategy lies in Trump's statements preceding the negotiations, when he indicated that Ukraine would be "a little different" after a settlement - a phrase carrying implications that go beyond a mere ceasefire, pointing to the possibility that Kyiv may be forced to accept the loss of parts of its territory.
Kushner's involvement in the file, and American talk of new Russian-European security arrangements, also reveal that Washington is not treating the war as a border conflict between two states alone, but as an entry point for reshaping the European security order that took shape after the Cold War.
This approach, as the ongoing discussions reveal, rests on two parallel tracks:
First: dealing with the territorial fait accompli.
Here I mean accepting a freeze of the current lines of contact, with the possibility of leaving the areas Russia controls under its effective administration, even without international legal recognition of Moscow's sovereignty over them.
A distinction must be drawn here between legal recognition of the Russian annexation and practical acceptance of freezing the lines of control. The second could be part of a settlement without necessarily meaning the first has occurred.
Second: reordering the European security architecture.
The discussion goes beyond the question of Ukraine's accession to NATO, reaching the future of Western military deployment, the security guarantees that could be offered to Kyiv, and the nature of the security relationship between Russia and the European states.
Reports indicate that the Trump administration wants to discuss a broader security agreement between Russia and Europe in parallel with an agreement to end the war, although Washington says any such arrangements would not be implemented without the consent of Ukraine and the Europeans, and that it does not intend to grant Moscow a veto over European security decisions.
But merely raising this track reflects an important shift: the United States is no longer content with managing the conflict; it is trying to negotiate the shape of the security order that will follow it.
It is precisely here that Trump's vision collides with European traditions holding that the continent's security cannot be reordered at the expense of the sovereignty of states and their right to choose their alliances.
The midterms.. The variable that could disrupt Trump's calculations
If the negotiations began amid a clear American desire to achieve a quick breakthrough, the results of the November 3, 2026 elections added a political variable of the utmost importance to the equation.
The Democrats scored a major victory and regained control of both houses of Congress, in a shift reflecting a clear decline in political support for the Republican Party and President Trump.
This victory does not mean the Democrats can cancel the negotiations or force Trump to continue the war, but it fundamentally changes the political environment in which the president operates during the period remaining before the new Congress convenes on January 3, 2027.
The impact of these results on the course of the war can be read through four axes:
Axis one: a window of time to accelerate the settlement before January
Trump has an opportunity to act during the weeks remaining before the new Congress takes office, and to conclude an agreement or executive framework he can present as a historic achievement of his foreign policy.
This may explain the desire to accelerate the pace of contacts between Abu Dhabi, Moscow and Dublin, and the attempt to turn preliminary understandings into a political agreement before the balance of power inside Washington changes.
But this window is not an open mandate; reaching an agreement also requires the consent of the parties concerned, and the US administration alone cannot guarantee Moscow's or Kyiv's commitment to it.
Axis two: the new Congress can complicate implementation of the agreement
It is true that the president holds broad powers in managing foreign policy and negotiating executive agreements, but Congress possesses important tools to influence their course.
A Democratic majority can push for new sanctions legislation on Russia, provide additional aid to Ukraine, and impose legislative restrictions on some options for American withdrawal from European defense commitments.
It can also use its legislative and oversight powers to review any understandings related to the future of Ukraine and European security, especially if they include concessions that Democratic Washington considers a threat to American interests.
Axis three: oversight and political investigations
Democratic control of the House of Representatives means their oversight committees regain the powers of investigation, subpoena and document requests, which could place the negotiations with Moscow under a harsher political microscope.
The questions raised may include the nature of the concessions Washington offered, the extent to which Kyiv and the European allies were informed of them, and whether the administration made commitments that exceed its powers or conflict with existing legislation.
The issue would thus not remain merely a Republican-Democratic dispute over policy toward Russia, but could turn into an oversight and legislative battle over the way Trump conducts foreign policy.
Axis four: Putin's calculations and exploiting the American divide
The Kremlin is likely to read the election results as evidence that the margin of political maneuver available to Trump will not remain open to the same degree over the next two years.
That could push Putin to stick to his maximalist demands, or to delay some concessions, waiting for further erosion in the American and Western position.
Conversely, the Democratic victory gives the Europeans and Kyiv a chance to rebuild a more cohesive position, benefiting from a stronger political ally inside American institutions.
From confidence-building measures to a fragile agreement.. The lesson of Budapest and Helsinki
What we see today in proposals concerning prisoner exchanges, humanitarian missions, the scheduling of new meetings, and the involvement of the Europeans in rounds of negotiation falls under what is diplomatically known as "confidence-building measures."
These measures are important, but they do not necessarily mean the parties have drawn close to a final political settlement.
Europe witnessed similar experiences during the Cold War, most notably the 1975 Helsinki Accords, which established a framework for cooperation and security dialogue and enshrined principles relating to the sovereignty of states and respect for borders, but did not end the strategic rivalry between the Eastern and Western blocs.
In the Ukrainian case, resuming dialogue and exchanging prisoners may be important steps, but they remain far from answering the most important question: what will prevent Russia from resuming the war if the political and military circumstances change in a few years?
Here the importance of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum experience emerges.
In that year, Ukraine gave up the nuclear arsenal it had inherited from the Soviet Union, in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the United States and Britain to respect its independence, sovereignty and existing borders.
But those assurances did not include a binding collective-defense mechanism resembling Article Five of the NATO treaty, and they did not prevent Russia from annexing the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and then launching its full-scale invasion in 2022.
Thus, the greatest danger for Ukraine is not necessarily that it loses territory in any settlement, but that it offers strategic concessions in exchange for political pledges that lack real mechanisms of implementation or deterrence.
That is the difference between an agreement that stops the war and one that ensures it does not break out again.
Can Trump repeat Nixon's China experiment?
Another historical comparison worth contemplating is President Richard Nixon's opening of relations with China in 1972.
Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger realized that the split between Moscow and Beijing could be exploited to reorder the international balance of power, and that rapprochement with China might grant Washington a strategic opportunity to weaken the communist camp from within.
It was an unconventional step, prepared through secret diplomatic channels and by a direct political decision from the president, despite opposition within various American institutions.
Trump may aspire to repeat something of this logic, but in the opposite direction this time: easing the confrontation with Moscow, or at least preventing Russia from turning into a strategic partner more closely bound to China, in a way that allows Washington to concentrate its resources on the competition with Beijing.
But the difference is that Nixon was investing in an already existing split between two communist powers, while Trump is trying to deal with a Russian-Chinese partnership that has deepened in recent years and rests on economic, security and political interests that are difficult to dismantle merely by ending the Ukraine war.
Therefore, Trump's success in stopping the war will not necessarily mean success in distancing Russia from China.
Trump's peace or Putin's truce?
Let us be clear: the Trump administration does not proceed from an ideological doctrine based on spreading democracy or reshaping political systems around the world, so much as from cost-benefit calculations and an ordering of priorities according to direct American interests.
On this basis, stopping the Ukraine war could be a gain for Trump even if Ukraine does not achieve all its goals, and even if Russia keeps the territories it has seized, as long as that allows Washington to scale back its European commitments and direct its attention and resources toward China.
The problem is that this logic could produce an agreement that serves short-term American calculations without addressing the roots of the conflict or providing sufficient guarantees for Ukraine.
And if the current track succeeds, even with a fragile agreement, Trump will be able to present it as a historic achievement, much as Nixon did when he opened the door to relations with China.
But if it fails, Ukraine may find itself facing a new version of the Budapest predicament: understandings, promises and political guarantees that do not prevent a repeat of the aggression against it.
The American midterm elections have made this possibility more complicated. Even if Trump manages to reach an agreement before January, the transfer of Congress to Democratic control will place the agreement in a more hostile political environment, and its survival and implementation may become the subject of an ongoing internal American dispute.
The paradox is that Trump wants to make a quick peace before his administration loses its room to maneuver, while this very haste may be what makes the peace he seeks less able to endure.
For negotiations are not peace, a ceasefire is no guarantee that the war will not reignite, and succeeding in extracting Washington from a crisis does not necessarily mean Washington succeeded in solving it.
In the end, the most important question may not be whether Trump will succeed in ending the Ukraine war, but whether the agreement he carries to the White House as a diplomatic victory will still stand after he leaves the scene.

